Congressman John R. Mica (R-FL), the chairman of the House Aviation Sub Committee, is one of these critics. He advocates that airports select the Opt-Out feature of the Aviation Transportation and Security Act (ATSA) that created the TSA. However, Senator John (Jay) Rockefeller (D-WV), ranking member of the Senate Commerce Committee’s Subcommittee on Health Care and vice chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, opposes the ATSA Opt-Out program and is supporting the continuation of the TSA. A number of airport directors have weighed in to express their skepticism about returning to a private screener arena under airport control. Other sources have also expressed their opposition to returning to the private screening arena.

The legislation that created the TSA was rushed through its development and through the Congress in the 11 weeks following the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. Given that haste, it is not surprising that unanticipated issues would surface. Creation of a 50,000- plus organization under crisis conditions was bound to result in unidentified problems. But a number of missteps by the TSA executives have generated additional problems. Added to these failings is the negative publicity associated with a number of TSA employees who have allegedly violated the public’s trust and have been indicted on charges of theft of items from passengers’ luggage.

Several TSA employees have been discharged because of alleged improprieties (e.g. fraudulent sales of aviation fuel at Miami International Airport). Other TSA employees have been charged with falsifying their employee applications and have been discharged. “Nationally, about 1,200 of 55,000-plus screeners were fired for lying on applications, criminal histories, or other concerns, according to the records,” the Associated Press reported.

Still others, including some Federal Security Directors, have been reassigned to other duties or discharged for alleged improper actions. A number of TSA employees, including Federal Security Directors, have resigned for reasons such as the job not being what they expected, lack of authority to effect actions locally, conflict with airport directors, and general dissatisfaction with guidance from TSA headquarters.

Notable among these problems are Albany Airport, (N.Y.) and Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, Washington. A host of charges have been lodged by employees against the TSA management at the Albany, N.Y., airport, as reported in the Albany Times Union:

“During the past several months, more than two dozen federal security screeners at Albany International were fired or forced to resign for a series of alleged violations that included sexual harassment, misconduct, credit card fraud, drug abuse and lying on job applications, authorities said.”

“Paul B. Varville, the airport's TSA director, defended the firings and contends he and his managers will be cleared of the allegations.” The situation at the Sea-Tac International Airport is a bit different but there are indications of serious organizational problems nonetheless. According to the Seattle Times: “Eight screening supervisors who were promoted into their positions in January at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport had their promotions rescinded this week as part of an ongoing investigation into personnel practices” and “...the TSA removed the airport's top four managers as part of a broader review of operations.”

As a consequence of these problems, the Sea-Tac International Airport FSD was replaced and transferred to the Washington, D.C., headquarters. The TSA Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review has begun reviews of the allegations at Albany and Seattle. Key executives in the TSA’s Washington, D.C., headquarters continue to change with the latest announcement that Randy Null, the head of TSA Aviation Operations, will become the new “acting” Phoenix International Airport FSD. Uncertainty and speculation surrounds the reasons for this downgrade reassignment and loss of position for Null. Ken Kasprisin, a former FEMA employee, is now the head of TSA Aviation Operations. These actions followed the recent U.S. Senate Confirmation of Admiral Stone as the new TSA Administrator. The interesting thing about Mr. Null’s downgrade reassignment is that he is going to the position as an “acting FSD” because someone else already occupies the position.

“The federal security director at Arizona's largest airport has been placed on leave amid accusations staff members intentionally lengthened passenger waits while asking the Homeland Security Department for more screeners,” reported the Associated Press. Admiral Stone’s confirmation as the new TSA executive makes him the third administrator in TSA’s short history. John Magaw from the Secret Service was the first administrator and he lasted for a few months before becoming persona non grata with Congress and the Administration. Magaw was replaced by retired Coast Guard Admiral James Loy who was later “promoted” to obscurity as the Deputy Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. These rapid-order changes at the top have contributed a great deal to the instability within the TSA.

In the TSA’s short history, it located, tested, hired, trained, and indoctrinated more than 60,000 persons in a little less than one year. It has also lost more than 10,000 employees after having “ramped up” to an initial operating employment level beyond its Congressionally authorized strength. A number of FSDs, particularly at the busier U.S. airports, have stated urgent needs for new employees, and would like local authority to hire and fire employees in order to handle the security screening workloads. In all these activities, the TSA and its DOT interim predecessor activities have spent and mismanaged tens of millions, and perhaps hundreds of millions of U.S. taxpayer’s dollars.

We continue to hear and read of failures of the TSA screeners to detect knives, guns and other prohibited items. These incidents beg the question of whether the TSA screening system is any better than the pre-Sept. 11 airline-run private screening system? A number of press releases have carried this question further by publishing snippets of data leaked to them from testing of the TSA’s aviation security screening system. The General Accounting Office (GAO) has also conducted assessments of the TSA’s screening system as has the Inspector General of the DOT and now the TSA.

In fairness to the TSA, many significant things are under way within the TSA both in the infrastructure of the overall U.S. screening system as well as the personnel system. But we must always keep foremost in our minds that we cannot have an effective aviation screening system if we do not first build a good people system. Unfortunately, that is the part of the system that needs the most attention at the moment. Dealing and/or fixing “things” — i.e. equipment — is easy compared with the building of a credible, effective and lastly “people” screening system. The “equipment’ development is moving along quite well, but the “people system” needs a great deal of attention.

With improved attention to cargo, catering, background screening and the like, TSA’s post-Sept. 11 screening system is more thorough. But is it sufficient to detect or deter future attacks? The answer is maybe — but only if added layers are incorporated and existing layers enhanced.

Billie H. Vincent is president and CEO of Aerospace Services International Inc., Chantilly, Va., and a former director of the FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security. ASI is an aviation security engineering design and consulting firm specializing in security systems for airports, airlines and head-of-state facilities. E-mail him at asi@asiwebsite.com